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Abstract
This paper describes two studies designed to test how two structural conditions of an in-
terview situation – the presence of an interviewer and use of incentives – influence respon-
dents’ preferences regarding inequality. According to goal-framing theory and findings 
from empirical justice research, different goal frames are activated in different types of 
relationships, producing different distributional preferences: Cooperative situations induce 
a normative goal frame resulting in a stronger preference for equality whereas competitive 
situations induce a gain frame in which individuals have stronger preferences for inequali-
ty. Assuming the former type of relationship is established by the presence of an interview-
er and the latter type by incentivizing, we conducted two studies to test our hypotheses. 
The results suggest that building a cooperative relationship through interviewer presence 
and cooperation priming leads to a preference for equality, while use of incentives leads to 
a clear preference for inequality. 
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1 Introduction
Research on survey methodology shows that the mode of data collection affects 
respondents’ willingness to participate and to provide information. Although sur-
vey errors such as coverage error, non-response error, and measurement error are 
not constant across survey modes, there are “typical” survey errors that are related 
to individual survey modes (Groves, 1989; Lindhjem & Navrud, 2011; Vannieu-
wenhuyze, Loosveldt, & Molenberghs, 2010). Some general findings indicate that 
certain topics, issues, and items are more likely to produce higher rates of sur-
vey errors; however, theories remain to be formulated that can predict response 
behaviors under certain structural interview conditions accurately. This inability 
to anticipate responses is especially relevant when it comes to understanding how 
different interview settings affect inequality preferences.
In order to identify measurement errors and to choose appropriate adjustment 
methods, it is essential to understand how certain structural conditions of an inter-
view situation evoke different response sets. This is particularly important in public 
opinion and attitude research where aggregate measures are used to draw substan-
tial conclusions about a society’s sentiments and opinions regarding political and 
societal issues.
Drawing on the “logic of justice” and goal-framing theory (GFT) (Linden-
berg, 2006), this paper attempts to explain how certain structural features of inter-
view situations affect respondents’ inequality preferences. We focus on two cru-
cial interview conditions that are found in most large-scale population surveys: 
interviewer presence and conditional incentives. The logic of justice suggests that 
different principles of justice are associated with specific types of social relations 
(Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997); accordingly, goods should be distributed 
equally in cooperative relationships and equitably in competitive relationships, and 
should correspond to individual needs in family and kinship relationships. If we 
apply these findings to large-scale survey research, inequality preferences should 
be affected by the kind of relationship respondents share in the situation in which 
they are completing the questionnaire. 
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By coupling the logic of justice with GFT, we argue that interviewer pres-
ence and use of conditional incentives establish different types of social relation-
ships in an interview setting. These types of relationships activate certain cognitive 
frames which in turn lead to individual preferences for more or less inequality. The 
first assumption is that interviewers try to establish a cooperative situation with the 
respondent in order to increase response rates. The second assumption is that the 
use of conditional incentives as a way of increasing response rates establishes an 
(economic) exchange situation that has the same character as a competitive social 
relationship. Therefore, we hypothesize that respondents will prefer a lower degree 
of inequality (i.e., more equality) in the presence of an interviewer and a higher 
degree of inequality (i.e., less equality) if they are given a conditional incentive for 
completing the questionnaire. 
To test these predictions, we conducted two experiments involving under-
graduate students at a German university (NStudy1 = 145; NStudy2 = 210). We varied 
the interview situations experimentally by having an experimenter in the room, by 
displaying stylized eyes on the computer screen (see Figure A1 in Appendix), by 
introducing priming techniques, and by offering monetary incentives. In order to 
lower the risk of social-desirability bias, individual preferences for inequality were 
measured indirectly through the use of a vignette module that focused on fair earn-
ings.
This paper is organized as follows: First, the concept of the logic of justice 
is introduced with reference to empirical justice research. We then report findings 
concerning the situational vulnerability of justice behavior and attitudes. The next 
section presents the theoretical model we used, which was based on GFT and our 
hypotheses concerning the situational dependence of (in)equality preferences. In 
the methods section, we describe the experimental design, measurement of vari-
ables, and sample issues. The paper concludes with a presentation and discussion 
of the findings.
2  Theoretical Background
2.1  The Logic of Justice
Because most of the resources we value in our lives are scarce, conflicts arise about 
the allocation and distribution of such goods. To solve this kind of conflict, sev-
eral norms and principles have emerged during human cultural evolution (Krebs, 
2008; Miller, 1999). As psychological justice research has shown, four principles 
are fundamental (Deutsch, 1975; Konow, 2001; Miller, 1999): equality (every-
body should receive the same), equity (benefits and burdens should be distributed 
proportionally according to individual investments), need (everybody should get 
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enough to cover basic needs), and entitlement (people should receive either benefits 
or burdens based on their ascribed or achieved status characteristics, such as gen-
der, education, occupation, or origin). One key empirical finding is that there is a 
homology between types of social relationships and the application of these justice 
principles. In very close long-term relationships, the principles of equality and need 
are preferred, whereas in competitive short-term relationships, the equity principle 
dominates, and in hierarchical relationships, entitlement is important (Törnblom, 
1992). The stronger the subjects’ social involvement in decisions concerning alloca-
tion (e.g., through direct personal contact with other subjects or the experimenter), 
the sooner subjects will base their decisions on the principles of equality or need 
(Konow, 2001). This applies even when respondents are asked to consider what 
would be a fair distribution of income in a society (Traub, Seidl, & Schmidt, 2009). 
In the early 1980s, researchers found that the type of social relationship determines 
which principle of justice is selected, but that there is also a reverse effect: the 
validity and application of the relevant principle of justice also has an impact on 
the nature of the social relationship. Equality and need-based rules strengthen close 
and long-term relationships, whereas rules based on the equity principle lead to the 
development of competitive short-term relationships (Schwinger, 1981).
The logic of justice evident in the homology between types of social relation-
ship and the respective justice principles can be further differentiated by using a 
typology introduced by Alan P. Fiske (1991; this paragraph is based on Liebig & 
Sauer 2013, 2015). Fiske assumes that there are four ideal types of social relation-
ships (Figure 1). The first type is driven by strong ties and long-term relationships 
between individuals. Here the individual is integrated into a community (Gemein-
schaft; see Tönnies, 1887) in which all members share the same origin and iden-
tity. These communities define themselves as solidary communities in which help-
ing one another is a given and will assure the survival of one’s group or family 
and – from an evolutionary perspective – the survival of one’s descendants and 
one’s genes. Classic examples are families and clans based on kinship relations. 
In such relationships, the distribution rule that would be considered “just” is the 
need principle: all individuals get as much as they need to survive. The second 
type is characterized by hierarchical relationships. Examples include pre-modern 
hierarchical societies (Ständegesellschaften) and bureaucratic organizations with 
different hierarchical levels in which each level has authority over the subordinate 
levels. In these contexts, the responsibility of higher-ranking individuals is to give 
instructions to lower-ranking individuals. Higher-ranking individuals have the 
power to sanction subordinates should they not follow the instructions, and they 
take responsibility for the lower-ranking individuals, who recognize their superi-
ors’ authority in return. The corresponding principle of justice in these situations is 
entitlement. All individuals get what they are entitled to according to their position 
in the hierarchical structure. The third type is marked by an absence of rank differ-
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ences. Examples include non-hierarchical networks, peer groups, and cooperatives. 
Members treat each other as equal despite individual differences, and everyone has 
the same rights and duties. Relationships are characterized primarily by mutual 
exchange in which – following strict reciprocity – the rewards and inputs between 
individuals are balanced. The dominant justice principle in this type of social rela-
tionship is equality. The fourth type is defined by short-term relationships between 
strangers and is typical of market relations. These are economic-exchange relation-
ships in which individual actors offer goods and services for maximum personal 
benefit. The related justice principle here is equity. 
The conclusion from this model is, first, that the meaning of justice is not 
based on any single principle that is superior to any other competing principle. Indi-
viduals can regard different distributive principles as just, applying each of them to 
different situations. Second, for each “ideal type” of social relationship there is a 
corresponding justice principle that constitutes what may be called the logic of jus-
tice. Therefore, the normative expectation is that goods will be distributed equally 
in social-exchange relations but equitably in economic-exchange situations. For our 
purposes, the crucial point is that within an interview situation, either type of social 
relationship may be established. If a respondent is offered a (conditional) incen-
tive for filling out the questionnaire, an economic-exchange situation between 
the interviewer and the interviewee is established. Once there is no monetary or 
non-monetary (conditional) incentive, a social-exchange relation is established –
respondents may invest their time in filling out a questionnaire because they think, 
for example, that it is their duty as a citizen, they see a chance to express their 
views, they want to get social approval from the interviewer, or they simply want to 
attract the interviewer. According to the logic of justice, different justice principles 
will be appropriate in both situations. In Section 2.2, we discuss research providing 
empirical evidence that the situational conditions of an experiment or an interview 
influence respondents’ preferences regarding how goods should be distributed. 
Type 1
Solidary communities:
Need 
Type 2
Hierarchical relationships: 
Entitlement 
Type 3
Social-exchange relationships: 
Equality 
Type 4
Economic-exchange relationships: 
Equity 
Figure 1 The logic of justice: homology between types of social relationship and 
justice principles
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2.2  Research on the Situational Conditions of Justice 
Behavior and Attitudes 
Studies in behavioral economics and social psychology have shown that the struc-
tural conditions of an interview situation affect the inequality preferences of 
respondents. These structural conditions are (1) framing with regard to the type of 
social relationship, (2) anonymity, and (3) incentivizing.
(1) Framing of a situation: In determining moves in an Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game, Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004) framed the dilemma as either 
a competitive or a cooperative situation by labeling it “Wall Street Game” or “Com-
munity Game.” Participants in the condition with the “Community Game” label 
were significantly more willing to cooperate with the other participants. Hertel 
and Fiedler (1994) primed their subjects by using evaluative and emotional prim-
ing with positive and negative connotations of cooperation and competition. As 
expected, the positive connotations of cooperation led the participants to cooper-
ate more. Hole (2011) tested how priming would influence the decisions of dic-
tators during the distribution phase by using a communication phase on fairness 
before a one-shot Dictator Game. Participants in the treatment group were asked 
during this communication phase what they thought might be a fair distribution. 
This resulted in significantly higher offers of the framed subjects (for an overview 
with precise descriptions of the games applied, see Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). This 
finding was supported by Liebig (2001) with regard to justice attitudes. Subjects 
who were given a detailed description of how philosophers understand justice and 
how justice attitudes must rely on moral judgment to overcome self-interest showed 
an attitude pattern on the justice of taxes that was less affected by self-interest. In 
sum, research shows the relational framing of a situation has an effect on the distri-
butional decision-making process.
(2) Anonymity: Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) varied the anonymity between 
participants in a Dictator Game. The more anonymous the situation was for the 
dictators, the less they were willing to give. Gächter and Fehr (1999) show similar 
results for investments in a public-good game. Communication between partici-
pants also led them to invest more in a trust game (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004) 
or to give the recipient more money in a Dictator Game (Xiao & Houser, 2009). 
Findings were similar when the family names of the players were revealed to the 
others (Charness & Gneezy, 2008) or the anonymity between subject and experi-
menter was varied (Bolton & Zwick, 1995).
There is some evidence that simply placing visual cues of eyes on a com-
puter screen alters behavior and inequality preferences (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 
2006; Burnham & Hare, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & 
Kitayama, 2009). In dictator games, images of eyes presented to the dictator led to 
higher-than-average monetary gifts for the recipient (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Rig-
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don et al., 2009). Similar results were found by Burnham and Hare (2007) in a pub-
lic-goods game displaying the image of a robot with human eyes on the computer 
screen. Subjects in the “eyes” condition contributed significantly more (29% more) 
to the public good than did subjects in the control condition (Burnham & Hare, 
2007). Bateson et al. (2006) displayed an image of a pair of eyes above an honesty 
box in a university coffee area and observed that people paid more for their coffee 
when they were “watched” by these eyes than in a control condition with neutral 
images. Their explanation of this finding is that cues of eyes subconsciously acti-
vate those brain regions responsible for detecting human faces, including gaze and 
facial expression. People are subconsciously aware of “being watched” or “being 
observed.” Aside from these findings, a more recent study did not find any effects of 
an image or cues of eyes on altruistic or equality-oriented behavior (Vogt, Efferson, 
Berger, & Fehr, 2014). 
(3) Incentivizing: In laboratory experiments, incentivizing is used in two 
ways: first as a “show-up” fee for participants and second as performance-related 
incentives incorporated into the experimental design. Average performance is not 
changed substantively by increased incentives, although the variance of responses 
often decreases (for a review, see Camerer & Hogarth, 1999, p. 9). Although 
increases in stakes in the dictator game apparently do not have a strong effect on 
the amount offered (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006, p. 625), people are less generous in 
allocation decisions when the stakes are real as opposed to hypothetical (Hertwig 
& Ortmann, 2001).
In survey research, the positive effect of incentives on willingness to partici-
pate and data quality is well documented (Becker & Mehlkop, 2011; Singer, Van 
Hoewyk, & Maher, 2000; Toepoel, 2012). However, the results for response bias 
are mixed. Most studies were not able to confirm incentive effects on responses 
(Becker & Mehlkop, 2011; James & Bolstein, 1990), but some found significant 
differences, at least for some attitudinal measures (James & Bolstein, 1990; Singer 
et al., 2000).1 However, we know little about the effects of incentives on inequality 
preferences in surveys.
To summarize, research suggests that (1) inequality preferences and distribu-
tive behavior are influenced by the framing of a situation, (2) inequality preferences 
depend on the social relationship established between actors, and (3) incentives 
shift behavior and inequality preferences to more selfish allocation strategies and 
higher-inequality preferences. Although each of the studies we referred to provides 
some theoretical reasons for the empirical results reported, there is no theoreti-
cal model that allows one to deduce testable assumptions as to which situational 
conditions we may expect to result in which inequality preferences. One theory 
1 James and Bolstein (1990) found that with larger monetary incentives, respondents ex-
pended greater effort in completing the questionnaire and made more favorable com-
ments about the survey sponsor.
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that could potentially serve as such a general theoretical model is Lindenberg’s 
GFT because it clarifies the theoretical link between the situational conditions and 
inequality preferences and helps to formulate specific hypotheses regarding the 
structural conditions in which people prefer more or less inequality in society. 
2.3  Using GFT to Explain Inequality Preferences 
Following the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1984, 2000) the literature 
on framing processes shows that when people make decisions they pay selective 
attention to situational cues. They retain cues that give them the information they 
need to pursue their current motivational goal while suppressing other information. 
At the same time, certain situational cues will activate specific information and 
knowledge in an individual’s memory. Both selective attention and the activation 
process are governed by a cognitive-motivational – or “framing” – process. This 
process includes the mechanism by which motivational goals influence the cog-
nitive processes of actors and their mental models of a given situation. A mental 
model is particularly relevant in social relationships because it contains informa-
tion about the prototype of a relationship and the behavioral rules, expectations, 
and social norms it involves. Therefore, it helps to know what kind of behavior is 
appropriate or expected in a specific situation. Actors use situational cues in order 
to define the kind of situation or relationship they are confronting and to act appro-
priately and efficiently according to their goals.
As part of a general theory of human action (Lindenberg, 1990, 2001, 2006), 
GFT distinguishes three types of “master goal frames” and forms the core motiva-
tion for behavior: a normative frame, the goal being “to act appropriately”; a gain 
frame, the goal being “to increase one’s resources”; and a hedonic frame, the goal 
being “to feel better” (Lindenberg, 2006). Each of the three frames has a different 
a priori strength to govern behavior. The hedonic frame is considered the strongest 
because it is closest to the psychological self and to emotions. The gain frame is 
considered second in strength, and the normative frame is the weakest because it 
depends largely on the support of other motivational goals that require the same 
behavior.
In a given situation, the master frame and mental model that are active depend 
on the structural conditions of that situation, an individual’s cultural knowledge 
(e.g., what rules exist for solving distributional conflicts), and, according to the 
more general theory of social production functions (Ormel, Lindenberg, Steverink, 
& Verbrugge, 1999), the actual level of physical and social well-being. We assume 
that the two basic structural conditions within an interview or experiment – i.e., 
the presence of an interviewer and use of incentives – will determine which of the 
master goal frames will be activated. Once a goal frame is activated, it is part of 
an individual’s “cultural” knowledge to know the “right” mental model for behav-
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ing appropriately. Here, the findings from justice research come into play: the cor-
responding mental model is the logic of justice in which an ideal type of social 
relationship connects with one of the four general justice principles.
In order to derive empirical assumptions about how the structural conditions 
of an interview situation result in “biases” in inequality preferences, we must (1) 
consider what type of social relationship is established within a survey interview 
and (2) ask what kind of expected behavior or attitude is related to it (Lindenberg, 
2006). In a non-incentivized survey or experiment, respondents receive no money 
for participating yet they bear costs in terms of time and answering cognitively 
demanding or personal questions. Assuming that other motivations to participate 
– curiosity, entertainment, or sympathy of the interviewer – cannot fully explain 
the response rates, non-incentivized surveys or experiments basically rely on the 
willingness of the participant to cooperate in order to produce a public good. Such 
cooperation is supported by interviewers in that they often try to motivate respon-
dents to participate by asking for “help” or “support.” Under these conditions, GFT 
assumes that the normative goal frame will be activated and a respondent’s goal is 
to act appropriately. The behavior associated with a normative goal frame is proso-
cial behavior, in which a person is prepared to bear costs to benefit others because 
it is appropriate to do so.2 According to the logic of justice, the dominant norm of 
allocating or distributing resources within a cooperative relationship is the equal-
ity principle. Under the condition of an activated normative goal frame, we expect 
respondents, when asked to evaluate inequalities, to formulate their judgments in 
light of the equality principle. Hence, respondents should reveal greater preferences 
for equal distribution in non-incentivized interview situations. The presence of 
an interviewer will confirm this equality orientation because the interviewer tries 
actively to establish a cooperative relationship; the interviewer will also be per-
ceived as an agency controlling whether or not respondents are acting appropriately. 
Incentivizing participation in a survey establishes a social relationship in 
which respondents would be oriented more toward their self-interest. Giving 
money conditionally for completing the questionnaire establishes an economic-
exchange relationship, that is, respondents are rewarded with a certain amount of 
money for investing their time and effort. Under these conditions, GFT assumes 
that respondents frame the situation according to their personal gain. Following 
the logic of justice, the principle required to solve distributional conflicts within 
economic-exchange situations is the equity principle; individuals receive a distribu-
tion according to their individual contributions. Hence, we would expect respon-
dents with an activated gain frame to assess inequalities on the basis of the equity 
principle, which leads to greater inequality preferences. 
2 Prosocial behavior can also be observed in the gain or hedonic frame, but the motiva-
tion is a different one. In the gain frame, people act prosocially when it is an efficient 
means to increase gain, and they do so in the hedonic frame when it feels good.
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Our baseline assumption is that the type of social relationship established in 
an interview setting will determine the activation of a specific cognitive frame that 
in turn will influence the response behavior (in this case, inequality preferences). In 
particular, we assume a cooperative relationship to activate a normative frame that 
induces preferences for equal distributions, whereas an economic-exchange situa-
tion or a competitive relationship (in contrast to a cooperative relationship) is likely 
to activate the gain frame, which induces greater inequality preferences. These 
structural conditions may cause biases in response behavior in survey research, 
especially regarding attitudes toward just distributions. We therefore expect two sit-
uational cues to be of specific importance: (a) the presence of others (e.g., an inter-
viewer) and (b) use of incentives. Four hypotheses are derived from the theoretical 
reasoning outlined above. The first two are more general assumptions related to the 
logic of justice and the stated correlation between type of social relationship and 
inequality preference: 
  (H1) In cooperative situations, the equality principle is the predominant justice 
norm, and therefore a more equal distribution of resources will be preferred. 
  (H2) In competitive situations, the equity principle is the predominant justice 
norm, and therefore a more unequal distribution of resources will be preferred.
From these two hypotheses follow two more specific hypotheses about the influ-
ence of the structural conditions within an interview situation and the normative 
preferences:
  (H3) In interviewer-assisted situations, the equality orientation is stronger com-
pared to situations in which the interviewer is not present.
  (H4) In incentivized interview situations, the inequality orientation is stronger 
compared to situations that are not incentivized.
3  Empirical Design 
In order to test our hypotheses, we needed an appropriate research design and an 
accurate measure of inequality preferences. We opted for a laboratory experiment 
(Study 1) and an experimental survey study (Study 2). The laboratory experiment 
had several advantages, one of which was that it allowed us to test the direct effect 
of a factor on the dependent variable in an artificial situation in which we were 
able to control for other factors. Furthermore, the random assignment of subjects to 
either the control group or the treatment group ensured that no external traits of the 
subjects would influence the measured effect (see also Webster & Sell, 2007, p. 12). 
In addressing our research question, the experiment provided the opportunity to 
control the interview situation in terms of presence of other individuals and inter-
viewer behavior. The second study was an experimental survey study. Respondents 
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were randomly assigned to treatments. In both studies, we chose from among three 
possible experimental conditions: (a) the activation of a specific mindset (coopera-
tion vs. neutrality, and cooperation vs. competition) through priming techniques 
(H1, H2), (b) the presence of another person while a self-administered question-
naire was completed (H3), and (c) use of conditional incentives for participation 
(H4).
Priming: In order to activate the normative or gain goal frame subliminally, 
we used the scrambled-sentence test as a priming technique. Originally introduced 
by Srull and Wyer (1979), this test appeared to be the most appropriate technique 
for our study. Before being presented with the actual questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to participate in a cognitive language test (which we called a Sprach-
fertigkeitsübung). They had to build logical sentences out of a given number of 
word sets. We expected to activate either a “cooperative” or a “competitive” mind-
set through the use of specific words associated with the two mindsets evoked. 
We varied the priming conditions in the two experiments and tested cooperation 
priming versus a neutral control group in Study 1 and cooperation priming versus 
competition priming in Study 2.
Presence of others: We used two different experimental setups to measure 
the influence of interviewer presence on inequality preferences: (a) the presence 
or absence of another person in the room (i.e. the laboratory) where the respon-
dent filled out the questionnaire on a computer (simulating interviewer presence 
or absence) in Study 1, and (b) the presence or absence of an image of eyes on 
the computer screen while the participants filled out the online questionnaire in 
Study 2 (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). In Study 1, the control group filled out 
the questionnaire without another person in the room; in Study 2, the control group 
completed the online questionnaire on a computer screen that did not show images 
of eyes. 
Incentives: In Study 2, we tested the effect of incentives on inequality pref-
erences. We randomly selected two groups of study subjects: the first group was 
asked to participate in our online survey without any incentive, whereas the second 
group was offered a payment of €5, to be paid after they had completed the ques-
tionnaire (conditional incentive), for participating in the study. Table 1 presents an 
overview of the research design for both studies. 
Inequality preference: One-item measures of attitudes toward earnings 
inequality are problematic because they produce virtually no variation in the 
responses regarding inequality preferences. Social desirability among other aspects 
may be a reason. Therefore, use of a factorial survey design (see Jasso, 2006; Rossi 
& Anderson, 1982; Wallander, 2009) appeared to be advisable because it allows the 
indirect measurement of specific preferences regarding earnings inequality by ask-
ing respondents to evaluate the justice of earnings on the basis of several descrip-
tions of fictitious employees (vignettes). These multiple evaluations of just earnings 
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can be used to reconstruct the individual inequality preference measured by an 
individual Gini coefficient.3 
For our study, we used vignettes that described full-time employees (working 
40 hours per week) who differ in ascribed and labor market–related characteristics 
and who earn a specific monthly gross income (see Table A1 in the Appendix).4 The 
selection of these dimensions was based on theoretical considerations grounded 
in previous studies (Alves, 1982; Jasso & Rossi, 1977; Jasso & Webster, 1997; 
Sauer, Auspurg, Hinz, & Liebig, 2011; Sauer et al., 2009; Struck et al., 2006). The 
vignettes were presented on a computer screen using the same layout in all experi-
mental settings (see Figure 1A in the Appendix). The following is an example of 
the wording used:
A 55-year-old woman with no vocational training has three children and 
works as a clerk.
She works in a company with a stable economic situation. Her perfor-
mance is above-average.
Her monthly gross earnings (before tax and other deductions) are €1,500.
A sample of 20 vignettes was drawn randomly from the vignette universe and 
presented to the subjects, meaning that each participant was asked to rate exactly 
3 The individual Gini coefficient measures the inequality preference of respondents. The 
coefficient reflects the inequality among values of a frequency distribution. Perfect 
equality is expressed by Gini=0, maximal inequality is expressed by Gini=1.
4 For an overview for the use of vignette studies in justice research, see Liebig et al. 2015.
Table 1 Research design of Study 1 and Study 2, according to the four study 
hypotheses
Study Priming (H1, H2) Presence of others (H3) Incentives (H4)
1 Cooperation vs. neutral Experimenter present:  
yes/no 
No treatment: Every 
participant received €10 as 
a conditional “show-up fee” 
(paid after completing the 
questionnaire) 
2 Cooperation vs.  
competition 
Eyes on screen: yes/no Participants received 
either no incentive or €5 
(paid after completing the 
questionnaire) 
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the same vignettes.5 The purpose of this evaluation task was to decide whether or 
not the specific amount of gross earnings was just for the person described in the 
vignette and, if not, what a just amount of gross earnings would be in local cur-
rency (euros).6 The just earnings provided by the participants were then used to 
calculate the Gini coefficient. This inequality measure is the outcome variable for 
all the following analyses.
4  Description and Results of Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test the effects of two experimental conditions on indi-
vidual inequality preferences: (1) the effect of a cooperation frame (induced by a 
priming instrument) (H1) and (2) the presence of others (presence or absence of the 
experimenter) (H3). The experiment was conducted at a German university during 
the winter term of 2011/12. All of the participants were undergraduate students 
who had responded to handouts containing basic information about the study (time, 
place, duration, and compensation) that were distributed in the main building of the 
university.
The sample consisted of 145 participants. These were randomly assigned to 
the different experimental treatments, as shown in Table 2: 65 participants (45%) 
completed the survey in the presence of another person, while 80 participants (55%) 
filled out the questionnaire with no other person present in the room; 79 (54%) of 
all participants were primed on cooperation, while 66 (46%) were given neutral 
primes. 
5 In other research designs, it is useful to draw several decks to collect ratings of as many 
vignettes as possible. Furthermore, sophisticated sampling techniques are recommend-
ed in order to arrive at efficient estimations of the coefficients (Atzmüller & Steiner, 
2010; Dülmer, 2007). However, this was not necessary in the setup described because 
we were investigating differences using different experimental settings.
6 To avoid response heuristics that would make it easier to state a preference for the earn-
ings described in the vignette by simply checking a box instead of typing in a value, 
participants had to insert a specific amount of money even if they thought the earnings 
stated were just. In the latter case, subjects had to type into the blank field the same 
value as was given in the vignette description. In the factorial survey literature, this is 
known as the “direct approach,” that is, an approach in which respondents use an open 
scale to insert a value, as opposed to the “indirect approach,” in which respondents do 
not provide a specific monetary value but instead use a justice scale to evaluate whether 
the value is just (sometimes by means of a rating scale but also with the use of open 
scales) and, subsequently, the researcher estimates the just earnings by means of indi-
vidual regression techniques (for details, see Jasso, 2006; Jasso & Wegener, 1997). As 
discussed in the literature, the direct answers may lead to anchor effects – i.e., respon-
dents adjusting their ratings to the income provided in the vignette – but this effect was 
not a problem in our study because only the differences between experimental groups 
were analyzed. 
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Table 2  Number of respondents per experimental condition in absolute values
Cooperation-primed group Control group N
No other person present 44 36 80 
Another person present 35 30 65
N 79 66 145
Data: “Experiment on the influence of cooperative relationships on justice evaluations.” 
(doi: 10.4119/unibi/sfb882.2012.1).
The experiments were conducted in two laboratories equipped with a computer 
screen on a table, along with a chair for the participant, as well as a table and chair 
for the experimenter when called for. Participants were asked to take the scram-
bled-sentence test and later to fill out a questionnaire regarding issues of social jus-
tice (including the vignette study on inequality preferences), personal background, 
and other questions used to control for side effects (e.g., using a social-desirability 
scale).7 On average, the questionnaire took 35 minutes to complete. 
4.1  Measurement
Inequality preferences were measured by the factorial survey design described in 
Section 3.8 
Priming: Participants were given 20 sets of four or five words in a scrambled 
order and were asked to construct grammatically correct sentences. The coopera-
tive mindset should be activated by words closely related to “cooperation” such as 
“together,” “help,” “cooperation,” “fair,” “trust,” and “sharing.” In total, 10 out of 
20 sentences (50%) included primed wordings. The priming instrument was devel-
oped on the basis of previous studies on cooperation priming (Bargh, Gollwitzer, 
Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Bry, Meyer, Oberlé, & Gherson, 2009; 
Drouvelis, Metcalfe, & Powdthavee, 2010; Kay & Ross, 2003). The control group 
received neutral sentences.9 
7 The questionnaire was programed using the web survey software Unipark.
8 For descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table A2 in the Appendix. 
9 Four participants reported that they were aware of being primed. To avoid contrast 
effects, we excluded these participants from the analyses. Another respondent was ex-
cluded because that participant failed to provide information on age and gender. The 
final analysis was thus based on 140 participants.
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Presence of others: All participants were welcomed by an experimenter10 who 
introduced them to the setup of the study. If the participant was randomly assigned 
to the experimental group, the experimenter stayed in the laboratory while the par-
ticipant filled out the questionnaire at the computer. The experimenter was asked 
to remain quiet, without watching the computer screen during the task. The experi-
menter paid the show-up fee to the participants after they completed the question-
naire. Participants in the control group were shown to the room by a secretary and 
filled out the questionnaire with no other person present in the room. These partici-
pants were paid the show-up fee in cash by the secretary after they completed the 
questionnaire. 
Incentives: All participants received a show-up fee of €10 in cash after com-
pleting the questionnaire. Because we did not vary incentivizing in this study, we 
are not able to test the effect of incentives. 
Social desirability: To ensure that our results would not be biased by social 
desirability, we used three items from the impression management scale, which 
is based on the work of Paulhus (1984, 1991) and which was empirically tested by 
Winkler, Kroh and Spiess (2006). 
4.2  Results
A comparison of the means of the individual Gini coefficients of participants with 
and without the presence of an experimenter revealed no significant difference 
in inequality preferences (Giniw/o = 0.29; Giniw/ = 0.31; t = -1.16; p(T>t) = 0.88). 
The same applied to the priming condition: participants who received cooperation 
priming did not deviate significantly in their reports on inequality preferences from 
those in the neutral priming condition (Ginicoop. = 0.29; Ginineutral = 0.30; t = 0.37; 
p(T>t) = 0.36). It would appear that neither presence of others nor cognitive prim-
ing on cooperation is a sufficient condition for activating a normative goal frame 
that would influence inequality preferences.
To filter the true effects of the two experimental conditions from effects 
induced by characteristics of the respondents, we performed an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, controlling for social desirability by including the 
impression management scale and the respondents’ gender and age. In a second 
model, we extended this basic model by adding interactional effects between the 
two experimental conditions to determine whether priming would have an effect 
on inequality preference depending on the absence or presence of an experimenter.
10 We recruited graduate students from a class on social stratification (master’s degree 
level) to work as experimenters (N = 14; 50% female). 
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Table 3  Preference for earnings inequality (Gini) regressed on two 
experimental conditions (cooperative priming and experimenter 
presence)
Preference for earnings inequality (Gini)
Model 1 Model 2
Treatments variables
Priming (cooperative = 1) -0.001 (0.013) 0.018 (0.017)
Experimenter (present = 1) 0.009 (0.012) 0.032* (0.018)
Priming * experimenter -0.043* (0.024)
Control variables
Social desirability -0.004 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008)
Gender (female = 1) -0.022+ (0.013) -0.023* (0.013)
Age (in years) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)
Constant 0.470*** (0.034) 0.464*** (0.034)
N 140 140
R2 0.154 0.172
Notes: OLS regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses, one-sided 
t-tests, +p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, doi:10.4119/unibi/sfb882.2012.1.
Table 3 shows the findings of both OLS regression models. The first model reports 
the main effects of the two experimental conditions while controlling for personal 
characteristics (social desirability, gender, and age); the second includes the inter-
actional effects. Even when controlling for personal characteristics, we found that 
our two experimental conditions had no main effects on the preference for earnings 
inequality (Model 1). Testing for interaction effects (Model 2) revealed that the 
cooperation priming condition was effective only if the experimenter was present in 
the room. Participants primed on cooperation preferred less inequality only in the 
presence of another person. If no one else was in the room, respondents in the two 
priming conditions showed the same response pattern regarding earnings inequal-
ity. Contrary to our prediction, presence of another person in the neutral priming 
condition was related to a preference for greater inequality. 
Of the control variables, only age and gender showed significant effects: older 
students and female students preferred a lower earnings inequality than did the 
younger students and male students. The scale for detecting a response bias toward 
social desirability had no effect. 
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4.3  Summary
As all respondents were paid for completing the questionnaire we induced an eco-
nomic exchange situation for all participants. Following our theory this results in 
an activation of the gain frame. Accordingly we expected a higher level of inequal-
ity preference for all respondents. Evidence is provided by comparing the constant 
of the regression models in Table 3 and Table 5 (Table 5 reports results from an 
experiment were payment is experimentally varied). While under the general pay-
ment condition of Study 1 the mean Gini the respondents considered as fair is .470 
(Model 1) resp. .464 (Model 2), the general level of preferred inequality in gross 
income in Study 2 is substantial lower (Model 1: .315, Model 2: .334). Seemingly, 
in Study 1 all respondents regardless the experimental treatment start with a higher 
level of income inequality as “economic exchange” is the default definition of the 
interview situation. The results for the experimental treatments indicate that only 
the combination of presence of the experimenter in the room and cooperation prim-
ing (activating a cooperative mindset) reduced individual inequality preferences 
significantly. Therefore, H1 and H3 are only partly confirmed: only when a coopera-
tive relationship was established by the presence of an experimenter and an induced 
cooperative mindset, respondents showed a stronger equality orientation. What is 
quite unclear, however, is why priming on cooperation had no significant main 
effect. In accordance with GFT, single activation of a normative frame should be 
enough to alter the behavior of individuals. There are at least three possible expla-
nations for this finding: (1) the priming was too weak and the difference between 
the two priming conditions was not distinct enough; (2) the priming instrument was 
filled out more seriously by the respondents when an experimenter was present and 
thus worked well only under this condition; and/or (3) participants knew that they 
would receive money for completing the interview, the gain frame was activated 
and the presence of another person was perceived as a “control mechanism” for 
checking how respondents behaved and to make sure they completed the question-
naire properly. In the last-mentioned case, the structural situational cues (incentive, 
person present) were stronger than the “psychological” cues of priming. The results 
on the condition “neutral priming, experimenter present” show that the presence of 
the experimenter may be interpreted as a control mechanism enforcing the struc-
tural induced framing. To better understand how incentivizing affects the response 
behavior on inequality preferences, we conducted a second study. 
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5  Description and Results of Study 2
Study 2 was designed as a follow-up study to test the effects of three experimental 
conditions on individual inequality preferences: (1) the differing effects of prim-
ing (cooperation vs. competition) (H1, H2), (2) the presence of others as simulated 
by eyes on the computer screen (eyes vs. no eyes) (H3), and (3) the influence of 
incentives (incentivized vs. voluntary participation) (H4). The study was conducted 
during the summer term of 2012 at the same German university. Respondents were 
recruited from an undergraduate course. Students received an email inviting them 
to participate in an online survey on inequality of earnings. Out of the 724 students 
invited to participate, 210 completed the questionnaire (response rates: 41% with 
incentive and 20% without incentive) (see Table 4). All participants were randomly 
selected; first, they had a 27.6 percent chance of being selected to the incentive 
sample; second, all participants had a 50 percent chance of being selected for the 
experimental conditions (priming and presence of eyes on the computer screen). 
5.1  Measurement
Inequality preferences were measured using the factorial survey design described 
in Section 3.11 
Priming for cooperation versus competition: We induced two mindsets: coop-
eration and competition. To improve the scrambled-sentence test we used in Study 
1, we reduced the number of word sets to 12 and increased the number of primed 
words sets to 9. For the most part, the “cooperation” primes resembled the words 
chosen for the first priming condition in Study 1. The “competition” primes were 
developed based on examples from the recent literature (Bargh et al., 2001; Bry et 
al., 2009; Kay & Ross, 2003). Words such as “competition,” “comparison,” “argu-
ing,” “power,” “assertion,” “provocation,” “winning,” and “inconsiderate behavior” 
were used to induce a competitive mindset. To ensure comparability of the two 
experimental conditions, the sentences differed only in the specific priming but not 
in their structure.12 
Presence of others: We chose to simulate the presence of others by displaying 
eyes on the computer screen while the respondent answered the questions. We used 
natural-looking eyes in the top right-hand corner of the screen (see Figure A1 in 
the Appendix). The eyes were not meant to be too prominent because we wanted 
to induce a feeling of someone being present at a subconscious level. Questions 
11 For descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table A2 in the Appendix.
12 To avoid any contrast effects, we excluded 3 of the 210 participants from our analyses 
because they showed signs that they were aware of being primed, and 11 participants 
because they failed to provide complete information on just earnings in the vignettes, 
gender, or age. The analysis is thus based on 191 respondents.
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concerning awareness and interpretation of the eyes were asked at the end of the 
questionnaire. In the control group, participants answered the same questionnaire, 
but the eyes were not present on the screen.
Social desirability: Again, we used the three items on social desirability, that 
is, impression management (see Winkler et al., 2006).
5.2  Results
When we compared the means of the individual Gini coefficients for participants 
with and for those without the presence of eyes on the computer screen, we found 
no difference in inequality preferences (Giniw/o = 0.28; Giniw/ = 0.28; t = −0.01; 
p(T<t) = 0.49). The priming condition also showed no significant differences in 
inequality preferences; although there is a tendency that participants who received 
cooperation priming preferred less inequality than did participants who received 
competition priming (Ginicoop. = 0.27; Ginicomp = 0.29; t = 1.55; p(T>t) = 0.06). 
The difference between the incentive and non-incentive condition was significant 
(Ginipayment = 0.29; Gininonpay. = 0.27; t = −2.01; p(T<t) = 0.02). To test whether these 
results were sensitive to the contextual setting and whether they were biased due 
to social desirability, we performed the following analysis using OLS regression. 
Again, we estimated two models, one testing only for the main effects of the 
three experimental conditions (Model 1) and the other including an interaction 
term for the priming condition and the “eyes on the screen” condition (Model 2) 
(Table 5). In both models we controlled for gender, age, and response bias (social 
desirability). We also added two variables to control for the interview situation: (1) 
if respondents were aware of the eyes on the screen and (2) if they completed the 
questionnaire while someone was in the room. The second question was asked to 
control for the presence of other people while the respondents filled out the online 
questionnaire.
Table 4  Number of respondents per experimental condition in absolute values
No incentive Incentive
No eyes Eyes No eyes Eyes N
Priming on cooperation 32 31 23 19 105
Priming on competition 35 31 19 20 105
N 67 62 42 39 210
Source: “Experiment on the influence of interviewer presence and incentivizing on justice 
evaluations.” (doi: 10.4119/unibi/sfb882.2012.2). 
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Two of our experimental conditions influenced the preferred earnings inequal-
ity. Respondents who were paid after they completed the questionnaire preferred 
greater earnings inequality than did those who participated in the study without 
payment. Priming also had a significant effect: those with cooperation priming 
(normative goal frame) preferred lower earnings inequality as compared with those 
with competition priming (gain frame). This is in line with our Hypotheses 3 and 
4. Contrary to our prediction, there was no significant main effect of “eyes on the 
screen,” although the regression coefficient showed the expected direction: those 
with eyes on their computer screen had slightly smaller Gini coefficients, which 
indicates that they preferred lower earnings inequality. Of our control variables, 
only the age of a respondent had a significant effect: older students – mostly from 
the social sciences – preferred less inequality. The results showed no bias for social 
Table 5  Preference for earnings inequality (Gini coefficient) regressed on three 
experimental conditions – competition, control (eyes), and payment)
Preference for earnings inequality (Gini)
Model 1 Model 2
Treatments
Incentive (yes = 1) 0.030** (0.012) 0.030** (0.012)
Priming  
(Cooperation = 1, competition = 0) -0.021* (0.012) -0.048** (0.016)
Eyes on screen (eyes = 1, no eyes = 0) -0.005 (0.012) -0.030* (0.017)
Cooperation priming with eyes on the 
screen 0.051** (0.024)
Control variables
Social desirability -0.005 (0.007) -0.007 (0.008)
Awareness of eyes on screen (yes = 1) -0.025 (0.026) -0.027 (0.026)
Any person present during completion 
of questionnaire (yes = 1) 0.009 (0.012) 0.009 (0.012)
Gender (female = 1) 0.003 (0.013) 0.004 (0.013)
Age (in years) -0.001* (0.001) -0.001* (0.001)
Constant 0.315*** (0.037) 0.334*** (0.026)
N 191 191
R2 0.021 0.088
Notes: N = 191, OLS regression coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses, one-
sided t-tests. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. doi:10.4119/unibi/sfb882.2012.1.
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desirability whether respondents became aware of the eyes on the screen or they 
were not alone while completing the questionnaire. 
In Model 2, we tested our previous finding that in the presence of an exper-
imenter or an interviewer, respondents who underwent cooperation priming 
endorsed less earnings inequality. Although the main effects of the two conditions 
“incentive” and “priming” remained more or less the same, the main effect of eyes 
on the screen was now significant. But, contrary to our predictions and to the find-
ings from Study 1, the interaction effect with priming was positive, meaning that 
those with a cooperative mindset and eyes on the screen preferred greater earnings 
inequality when compared with those in the experimental condition “cooperation 
priming with no eyes on the screen” (pF = .106, one sided F-test). These results 
showed no biases for the control variables social desirability, awareness of eyes, 
and people present while the questionnaire was being filled out. As for Study 1 we 
provide the estimated Gini level for the eight experimental combinations in Fig-
ure 2. Again, it can be seen that cooperative primed respondents without incentive 
(and without eyes on the screen) showed the lowest level of estimated Gini (0.286), 
while competitive primed respondents with incentive the highest level (0.364). 
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Note: Based on Model 2 (Table 5) only considering the constant and the coefficients of 
incentive, priming, eyes on the screen and the interaction of the two latter main effects. 
Figure 2  Estimated levels of preferred inequality (Gini) for the combination of 
two experimental treatments 
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5.3  Summary
Study 2 provided evidence that respondents who received a payment for complet-
ing the questionnaire showed a significantly greater preference for inequality than 
did those who completed the questionnaire voluntarily. Together with the findings 
from Study 1 – where all participants received an incentive and we observed a gen-
eral higher level of inequality preference (constant in Study 1 regression: .470/.464 
vs. constant in Study 2 regression: .315/.334) – these results support Hypothesis 4. 
The finding holds independently of any priming effect. Our explanation is that by 
using conditional incentives, an economic-exchange relation is established and the 
respondents will act according to their gain frame. However, the results on type 
of relationship (relational mindsets) and presence of an interviewer only partly 
confirmed our other three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3): only in the no-eyes condi-
tion did respondents who had a cooperative mindset prefer more equality and who 
received competition priming more inequality. The presence of eyes on the screen 
revealed no clear effects: respondents with a competitive mindset showed slightly 
lower inequality preferences, whereas those with a cooperative mindset preferred 
slightly greater inequality (differences are on the third decimal place). These find-
ings leave room for speculation as to whether the condition “eyes on the screen” can 
truly function as a substitute for the presence of another person, as we had assumed 
at the outset. Eyes on the screen may not necessarily induce cooperation but may be 
perceived as situational cues for social control and anticipated sanctions for norm-
violating behavior as we already assumed in Study 1. Because recent studies have 
reported heterogeneous and contradictory results when investigating whether the 
presence of eyes on the computer screen would affect altruistic or egoistic behavior 
(see Vogt et al., 2014), we suspect that this instrument might not be valid as a sub-
stitute for the presence of an interviewer. 
6  Discussion
Large-scale population surveys are predominantly based on interviewer-assisted 
data collection, and incentivizing is becoming a more common practice in sur-
vey research. In this study, we investigated whether these structural conditions of 
interview situations influence individual inequality preferences. In keeping with 
GFT and empirical justice research, the main argument was that in both structural 
conditions – presence of an interviewer and use of incentives – different types of 
social relationships are established and either a normative frame or a gain frame is 
activated in the respondent. The consequence of different framing is that respon-
dents will apply different distributive principles when evaluating earnings inequal-
ity according to the “logic of justice.” In normative framing, the equality principle 
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is dominant, whereas in gain framing, the equity principle is the appropriate dis-
tributive principle. Therefore, in a survey setting, having another person present in 
the interview room in addition to establishing a cooperative relationship by means 
of priming was expected to influence respondents’ preferences in favor of a more 
equal distribution of earnings. In contrast, when respondents are paid for partici-
pating and a competitive relationship is established through priming, their prefer-
ence will be for less equal distributions. 
The results of two experiments we conducted involving students at a German 
university showed that establishing a competitive relationship by incentivizing 
respondents led to a response bias toward greater earnings inequality. The results 
concerning the presence of an interviewer were not as straightforward: the combi-
nation of interviewer presence and the inducing of a cooperative relationship led to 
an equality bias. Hence, the mere presence of an interviewer was not sufficient to 
trigger a normative framing of the interview situation. The use of styled eyes on the 
computer screen while respondents filled out the online questionnaire was intended 
to serve as a substitute for interviewer presence, but the results of this test were 
heterogeneous and in fact contradictory. Instead, the respondents appeared to feel 
watched or controlled by the eyes on the screen, which undermined the perception 
of a cooperative relationship and failed to activate a normative goal frame. 
In general, our results raise the concern that measures of inequality prefer-
ences are affected by situational conditions and cues. The effects of paying respon-
dents for completing a questionnaire were the most robust, incentives induced pref-
erences for higher inequality. But, since we used student samples and interviewer 
settings that are not strictly comparable with those used in large population sur-
veys, our results cannot be generalized and simply transferred to the “survey real-
ity.” Our assumptions must therefore be tested under more appropriate conditions. 
Nevertheless, we were able to show that certain effects of the study design must 
be controlled for because they can influence the substantive findings of surveys on 
inequality preferences. 
Overall, our results suggest that population surveys on attitudes toward social 
inequality or social justice should not rely on one mode of data collection alone. 
Each mode is characterized by different structural conditions and produces certain 
situational cues that affect respondents’ behavior systematically. If our experimen-
tal data on the effects of the presence of experimenter in combination with a coop-
erative mindset reflect a general phenomenon of framing and adapting of inequality 
preferences to situational cues, survey data using interviewer-assisted modes may 
overestimate the equality orientation within a population. This might be the case 
when interviewers establish a cooperative relationship with their respondents within 
the interview situation and by doing so strengthen a normative, equality oriented 
framing. Interviewers from a recent German employee-survey on the perceptions 
and evaluations of social inequality (LINOS1, DOI: 10.4119/unibi/sfb882.2014.9, 
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CAPI-split, N = 1007) report for 59 percent of the completed interviews that the 
interview situation was characterized by a cooperative and trustful mindset of the 
respondent. If respondents of this survey show the same response pattern under the 
conditions of a collaborative mindset and present of interviewer, we expect a sub-
stantial equality oriented response bias.
As effects of conditional incentivizing on inequality preferences were observed 
in both studies, our results contribute to the ongoing discussion about whether 
large-scale population surveys should use incentives to increase respondents’ will-
ingness to participate. Aside from the question of whether payment really contrib-
utes to higher-quality data by increasing the response rates in population surveys, 
our study showed that paying for participation is relevant not only for methodologi-
cal purposes but also for substantive issues. If other respondents behave towards 
incentives the same way as our student sample did, we may observe a very different 
picture of the inequality preferences within a society. Therefore, the question to 
be addressed in future research is which attitudes are relevant to political or other 
types of behavior – those resulting from a normative frame or those resulting from 
a gain frame.
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Appendix
Table A1  Vignette dimensions and their levels as used in both studies
# Dimensions Levels
1 Age 30/40/50/60 years
2 Sex Male/female
3 Vocational degree Without degree/vocational degree/university degree
4 Occupation Unskilled worker/door(wo)man/engine driver/clerk/ 
hairdresser/social worker/software engineer/electrical 
engineer/manager/medical doctor 
5 Gross earnings/month 10 values, ranging from €500 to €15,000
6 Children 1 to 5 (1 = No child, 2 = one child, 3 = two children, 
4 = three children, 5= four children)
7 Performance Below-average/above-average
8 Economic situation of the firm High profits/threatened by bankruptcy/solid
Table A2  Descriptive statistics for variables used in the models (studies 1 and 2)
Mean SD Min. Max.
Study 1 (N = 140)
Preferred earnings inequality (Gini) 0.298 0.079 0.065 0.619
Priming (cooperation = 1, no cooperation = 0) 0.529 — 0 1
Person present (yes = 1) 0.450 — 0 1
Social desirability 0.000 0.803 -2.288 1.509
Gender (female = 1) 0.671 — 0 1
Age (in years) 24.379 5.136 18 59
Study 2 (N = 191)
Preferred earnings inequality (Gini) 0.278 0.086 0.014 0.595
Incentive (yes = 1) 0.403 — 0 1
Priming (cooperation = 1, no cooperation = 0) 0.476 — 0 1
Eyes on screen (yes = 1) 0.518 — 0 1
Social desirability 0.000 0.838 -2.246 1.547
Awareness of eyes on screen (yes = 1) 0.094 — 0 1
Person present (yes = 1) 0.267 — 0 1
Gender (female = 1) 0.408 — 0 1
Age (in years) 22.869 4.132 19 60
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 Figure A1   Image of “eyes on the screen” condition in Study 2 (cf. p. 68)
